US scholar expects more Pakistan-backed terror in Afghanistan, calls for stick
"American diplomats and journalists operating in Pakistan may be
subject to increased harassment. Notably, Radio Mashaal, the Pashto-language
service of Radio Free Europe, had its branch in Pakistan abruptly closed on
January 19, accused by the Interior Ministry of working on behalf of “hostile
foreign intelligence agencies.” Jeff
M. Smith is a research fellow in Heritage's Asian Studies Center, focusing on
South Asia and the author of "Cold Peace:
China-India Rivalry in the 21st Century" told the Asia and pacific subcommittee of the US Foreign Affairs Committee.
Smith cited former Pakistani Ambassador to
the U.S. Husain Haqqani, author of the Magnificent Delusions, as saying U.S. aid “makes hardliners in Pakistan
believe they are too important to the U.S., and they can do anything they
please.”
Smith heaved a sigh of relief members in Congress began to recognize Haqqani's plea years ago and
their frustration has been reflected in a steady decline of aid over the past
three years. "The request for appropriations and military reimbursements to
Pakistan fell from $2.6 billion in 2013, to $1.6 billion in 2015, to roughly
$350 million for fiscal year 2018," Smith said
He said while it was not the first to do so, the Trump
Administration signaled very early in its tenure that business as usual with
Pakistan was coming to an end. “We’re out to change [Pakistan’s] behavior and
do it very firmly,” Defense Secretary Mattis insisted last year.
“This is a
conditions-based approach and our relationship with Pakistan will also be
conditions-based; based on whether they take action,” added Secretary Rex
Tillerson. On the ground, the Administration authorized an increase in drone
strikes in Pakistan, including a strike in Kohat that represents the “deepest
that American drones have penetrated into Pakistan’s airspace.”
The Trump administration also placed
Pakistan on a Special Watch List for religious freedom violations. Its December
2017 National Security Strategy insists “no partnership can survive a country’s
support for militants and terrorists who target a partner’s own service members
and officials.”
As longtime Pakistan watchers predicted, the Administration’s
warnings fell on deaf ears. “No, I haven't seen any change yet in [Pakistan's]
behavior,” General John Nicholson, America’s top military commander in
Afghanistan, admitted in November 2017.
Instead, Pakistan returned to a
familiar playbook of deflection, denial, conspiracy, and outright military
threats. If President Trump “wants Pakistan to become a graveyard for U.S.
troops, let him do so,” the chairman of Pakistan’s senate warned last August.
After U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley insisted Pakistan’s “game is
not acceptable to this administration,” a Pakistani military spokesman
explained that Haley is of Indian origin and the “current misunderstanding
between Pakistan and the U.S. is created by India.”
In this context,
President Trump’s January 1 announcement of a suspension of U.S. aid to
Pakistan was not only merited but long overdue. The time has come to rewrite
the terms of the U.S.–Pakistan relationship.
The contours of a
more effective, equitable, and, where necessary, punitive Pakistan strategy
have been evident for years. Such an approach was outlined in an excellent 2017
paper, “A New U.S. Approach to Pakistan: Enforcing Aid Conditions Without
Cutting Ties,” co-authored by the Hudson Institute’s Husain Haqqani and Lisa Curtis,
then at The Heritage Foundation.
Among their recommendations: · Reducing U.S. aid; · Prioritizing engagement
with Pakistan’s civilian leadership; ·
Working with international partners to diplomatically isolate Pakistan; · Increasing unilateral
drone strikes inside Pakistan; ·
Sanctioning Pakistani military and ISI officials known to have facilitated acts
of terrorism, including travel bans; and ·
Consideration of designating Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism and
suspending Pakistan’s non-NATO-ally status.
The Trump Administration has
already begun adopting some elements of this strategy, including increasing
drone strikes, reducing U.S. aid, and diplomatically isolating Pakistan. Moving
forward it is important the Administration present a clear schedule of demands
linked to specific timetables and a specific set of intensifying consequences
should Pakistan fail to act on those demands.
Balochistan, FATA, Gilgit-Baltistan & Mohajirs
For too long the U.S. has turned a blind eye to what is by all accounts a deeply troubling human rights situation in Pakistan. Women, Christians, Shi’ites, ethnic minorities like the Baloch, the forgotten people of Gilgit-Baltistan, and Islamic sects like the Ahmadis, are regularly subjected to violence, persecution, discrimination, and state-supported repression. Journalists critical of Pakistan’s military and intelligence services routinely “disappear.”
Nearly two dozen people are on death row as a result of Pakistan’s draconian blasphemy laws and hundreds more have been convicted or killed simply for being accused of insulting the Prophet Muhammed or Islam.
As Amnesty International notes, in recent years Pakistan’s security forces perpetrated human rights violations such as arbitrary arrests, torture and other ill-treatment, and extrajudicial executions. Security laws and practices, and the absence of any independent mechanisms to investigate the security forces and hold them accountable, allowed government forces to commit such violations with near-total impunity.
State and non-state actors continue to harass, threaten, detain and kill human rights defenders, especially in Balochistan, FATA and Karachi.19 Mohajirs, immigrants that migrated to Pakistan from India after the 1947 Partition, have also complained of mass-scale human rights violations at the hands of Pakistan’s security forces as well as economic, political, and social injustices.
Based mostly in Karachi, the Mohajirs are one of the few communities in Pakistan to publicly condemn the government’s support for extremism and the Talibanization of society—and in recent years have paid a heavy price for it. The era of excessive deference to Pakistan’s sensitivities on the subject of human rights and religious freedom abuses should come to an end.
Some key points of Jeff M. Smith testimony
General Jack Keane (ret.), while examining Pakistan’s “double game” in
Afghanistan. Came to a dour conclusion: “The evidence is unequivocal that the
government of Pakistan and the military leadership of Pakistan aids and abets
[militant] sanctuaries…That is the absolute facts of it. Some of them
are—actually receive training from Pakistan forces.”
The then-Director of National Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair
delivered his own frustrating conclusion to Congress: “No improvement in
Afghanistan is possible without Pakistan taking control of its border areas.”
Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network, by the account of every
interested intelligence agency and objective analyst in the world, have received varying levels of support and safe haven from the Pakistani
military and its notorious spy service, the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency
(ISI). AccordingThe Haqqani Network, former
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, said “acts a
veritable arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency,” Haqqani group was almost certainly responsible for the
December 30, 2009, bombing of a CIA agency outpost in Khost, Afghanistan, that
killed seven officers—the single deadliest attack on the agency in its storied
history.
The Haqqani Network was also linked to the September 2011 attack on
the U.S. embassy in Kabul that resulted in seven deaths and 15 injuries. Most recently, a U.S. military spokesman said he was “very
confident” the Haqqani Network was behind a January 28 attack on a hotel in
Kabul that killed more than 100 people, including several U.S. citizens.5 3
Whereas Washington, Kabul, and most of the international community
have strived to build a peaceful, stable, democratic Afghanistan, Pakistan’s
ideal objective is an Afghan government that is pliable, submissive, and
hostile to India. The reason why Islamabad sponsors bloodshed and chaos is its
fears a stable Afghan government might be tempted to: (1) stir unrest among
Pakistan’s restive Pashtun population; (2) invite a greater role for India,
which Pakistan believes is determined to encircle and dismember it; and (3)
challenge the legitimacy of the Durand Line, the Afghanistan–Pakistan border
that no Afghan government has recognized, including the Taliban government of
the 1990s.
Pakistan’s paranoid obsession with India has proven particularly ruinous. Only
if Pakistan is under omnipresent threat from India, the U.S., Afghanistan, and
other phantom menaces can the Pakistani military justify its generous budget
and its tight grip on power.
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